Guinea-Bissau/Elections: Massive presence of the international community is a factor of dissuasion

Press Release 

Guinea-Bissau/Elections: 

Massive presence of the international community is a factor of dissuasion – SRSG Ramos-Horta 

 Bissau-UNIOGBIS, 12 abr-2014 – The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) toGuinea-Bissau today stated that the massive presence of high level international missions of observers to the general elections on Sunday April 13, is a positive factor that shows the interest of the international community in Guinea-Bissau as well as a factor of dissuasion from past practices towards a new country ready to move towards development.

 “ The international community’s interest in the elections and the return of Guinea-Bissau to constitutional order, showed through the presence of more than 400 observers, is a factor of deep interest and dissuasion and therefore of stability ”,said UNIOGBIS leader.

The Nobel Peace Prize laureate spoke at the end of a high level meeting with the President of ECOWASCommission, Kadiré Desirée Ouedraogo, and with the chief of the observer’s mission of this pan-african organization, former Liberia Head of State Amos Sawyer, among other personalities.

The meeting, requested by the President of ECOWAS Commission, held at a hotel in Bissau, aimed at exchange of views on the final stage of the process leading to the legislative andpresidential elections, as well as to express gratitude to José Ramos-Horta and UNIOGBIS for all efforts displayed in support of returning Guinea-Bissau to constitutional order, and also to Timor-Leste for the generous solidarity allowing the elections to be held.

“ ECOWAS Commission President congratulated UNIOGBIS and SRSG in particular for the remarkable progress and expressed his gratitude for Timor-Leste support to Guinea-Bissau,ECOWAS and in effect   Africain general”, he said.

The Nobel Peace Prize laureate noted that the performance of ECOWAS and ECOMIB is commendable. He noted that it is impressive that the situation on the ground is peaceful and does not raise concerns. The international community has in Guinea-Bissau four ex-Heads of State and ministers, and above 400 observers, revealing an attention which is both “dissuasive and a sign of stability”, said SRSG. 

UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, chose the Nobel Peace Prize laureate José Ramos-Horta to lead UNIOGBIS when Guinea-Bissau was at the bottom of the interests of the international community. Today, the country is back in the map.

One year has passed since the SRSG ’s arrival and it is visible that Ban Ki-moon’s intentionsare a success thanks to the efforts of  José Ramos-Horta who, tirelessly, lobbied and made the necessary political pressures to mobilize the international community in recognizing the laudable role ECOWAS took in the beginning to avoid a descent to anarchy in Guinea-Bissau. The collaboration of Ramos-Horta and partners has resulted in many electoral observers.

“ As big is the intervention,bigger is prevention”, concluded Ramos-Horta.  

Jose Meirelles

Chief Public Information 

UNIOGBIS spokesperson

United Nations Building

Bairro Penha - Bissau

Guinea Bissau

email: meirelles@un.org

Office: +390831059000 Ext: 193 6124

Cel: +245 6136045

Website: www. uniogbis.unmissions.org

HAVING IT BOTH WAYS: AUSTRALIA'S CONFLICTED POSITION IN THE TIMOR SEA

By Sarita Ryan

According to Alexander Downer, former Australian Foreign Minister and subsequent board advisor to Woodside Petroleum, a country's reputation is on the line. Downer claims that Timor-Leste's appeal to terminate a key treaty with Australia in the Permanent Court of Arbitration reveals the tiny nation to be an unruly negotiator:

'This is exactly why developed countries are reluctant to invest in developing countries. The sovereign risk is too high. An agreement, a law, a treaty is only okay when it suits the government -- East Timor will win a reputation for being unreliable with no leverage to gain extra revenue from its reckless policy. As a person who did so much to get East Timorese their independence, that makes me sad.'

Recent proceedings have suggested that it might be Australia, rather than Timor-Leste, that is currently most at risk of gaining a bad reputation. When Sir Eli Lauterpacht, Timor-Leste's leading counsel at the International Court of Justice, dubbed ASIO's confiscation of evidence 'improper and inexplicable', Australia's legal team responded to the assertions as 'wounding'. Unfortunately for Australia, hurt feelings didn't translate into a legal high ground in the ICJ, and it's possible there are more sad faces to come; the ANU's Donald Anton notes that if Timor-Leste's allegations prove true, and Australia is found to have gained an unfair advantage in treaty negotiations through spying on Timor-Leste, Australia may earn the dubious distinction of being the first known state to have a treaty declared invalid on account of fraud (under Article 49 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). Australia may well be losing the image game in its dealings withTimor-Leste.

For decades, Australia has sought to carefully manage the conflicting positions of its desire for resource control in the Timor Sea and its image as a nation aligned with the moral principles of sovereignty and self- determination. It is now looking increasingly like Australia may not be able to have it both ways. Contrary to Downer's claim, the arbitration case concerns more than the gain of 'extra revenue' in Timor-Leste. Certainly, this is a case about oil and espionage, fair resource distribution and good faith in agreements between nations. However, the drama surrounding the spying scandal is something of the tip of an older issue: Timor-Leste's ongoing struggle to become an independent, sovereign state, complete with maritime boundaries, and Australia's fraught position in this process.

La'o Hamutuk, a prominent Timorese civil society organisation, has held several briefings for local and Australian journalists over the past few months to clarify a significant degree of confusion surrounding the case, including an often repeated claim that Timor-Leste's arbitration case is seeking to redraw Australian/Timorese maritime borders. The organisation stressed that permanent maritime boundaries have never been set between Australia and Timor-Leste, rather, previous agreements have related to the division of resources in the Timor Sea. In taking the present case to the Permanent Court of Arbitration, Timor-Leste is seeking not only a re-division of oil and gas reserves in the Timor Sea, but the establishment of maritime boundaries in accordance with international law, a persistent issue since the beginning of Australian/Timorese resource negotiations. As Juvinal Dias, a researcher at La'o Hamutuk, stressed, '(the arbitration case) is not just about oil. It's about sovereignty-- This struggle is like the struggle for independence.'

The story of Australian and Timorese oil and gas negotiations has been well documented,but is necessary to revisit in order to chart Australia's long-term strategy in the Timor Sea. Discovered by Woodside Petroleum in the early 1970s, the untapped resources in the Greater Sunrise field, worth an estimated $40 billion, proved highly influential on Australia's position regarding an independent Timor-Leste. In 1974, reflecting global trends in maritime agreements, Portuguese Timor advocated for resource sharing along a median line between the two countries, under which Australia would have received little or nil of the resources. On the contrary, precedent suggested that Indonesia would be far more amenable to Australia claiming a significant

proportion; Indonesia and Australia had previously negotiated maritime boundaries based on the outdated 'continental shelf' principle, resulting in a deal that was referred to in Indonesia as 'Australia taking us to the cleaners'. The following diplomatic cable, from the year prior to the collapse of Portuguese colonial rule and Indonesia's subsequent invasion of Timor- Leste, reveals the extent to which resources were at the forefront of Australian concerns, coupled with a need to maintain an image of impartiality:

'The Indonesians would probably be prepared to accept the same compromise as they did in the negotiations already completed on the seabed boundary between our two countries. Such a compromise would be more acceptable to us than the present Portuguese position. For precisely this reason however, we should be careful not to be seen as pushing for self-government or independence for Portuguese Timor or for it to become part of Indonesia, as this would probably be interpreted as evidence of our self-interest in the seabed boundary disputerather than a genuine concern for the future of Portuguese Timor.'

In 1975, Australia chose to adopt a 'realist' rather than 'idealist' position on Timorese self-determination, which was argued to provide not just greater regional stability, but greater possibilities for resource access. This famous letter from Richard Woolcott, Australian Ambassador to Indonesia in 1975, provides the background of Australia's tacit approval of the Indonesianannexation of Timor-Leste:

It would seem to me that (the Australian) Department (of Minerals and Energy) might well have an interest in closing the present gap in the agreed sea border and that this could be much more readily negotiated with Indonesia-than with Portugal or independent Portuguese Timor--I know I am recommending a pragmatic rather than a principled stand (regarding Indonesian annexation) but this is what national interest and foreign policy is all about.'

This 'pragmatic' position proved highly profitable for Australia. Following Indonesia's 1975 invasion of Timor-Leste, Australia and Indonesia signed the Timor Gap Treaty (1989). By this stage, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) had come into effect, establishing the median line principle as the basis for setting maritime jurisdictions between countries less than 400 nautical miles apart. However, in a highly favourable deal to Australia, the Timor Gap Treaty divided the resources between the 1972 boundary and the median line equally. The treaty proved extremely profitable, with Australia netting more than $2 billion in government taxes from the Laminaria-Corallina fields alone. These fields are now largely depleted.

In the late 1990s, the growing surge for independence in Timor-Leste threw all previous agreements between Indonesia and Australia into doubt. In anticipation, Australia withdrew its recognition of the maritime boundary dispute jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, just two months prior to Timor- Leste's declaration of independence. At the time, Downer asserted that it was it was Australia's 'strong view is that any maritime boundary dispute is best settled by negotiation rather than litigation.' Timor Sea agreements between the newly independent Timor-Leste and Australia were then negotiated directly between the two countries, without reference to UNCLOS. The resulting Timor Sea Treaty (signed in 2002, ratified in 2003) established that fields in the Joint Petroleum Development Area (JPDA), such as Bayu Undan, are shared via a 90% (Timor-Leste) and 10% (Australia) split, an improvement on the 50/50 split under Indonesian rule. This appears considerably more equitable than the earlier arrangement; however, it must be kept in mind that Australia would not be entitled to any of these resources under the median line principle. During the negotiations, Timor-Leste repeatedly tried to raise the issue of permanent maritime boundaries along a median line, prompting this well documented outburst from Downer: 'We don't have to exploit the resources (in Bayu Undan). They can stay there for 20, 40, 50 years. We are very tough. We will not care if you give information to the media. Let me give you a tutorial in politics-not a chance.'

Another key problem of the Timor Sea Treaty was its link to the Sunrise-International Unification Agreement (referred to in this article as the 'Sunrise Agreement'). Despite the Greater Sunrise field falling entirely in Timor-Leste's maritime territory under UNCLOS, the Sunrise Agreement stated that less than 20% of Greater Sunrise lay within the JPDA, with the remaining 80% assigned to Australia. Australia would not ratify the Timor Sea Treaty until Timor had signed the Sunrise Agreement, delaying desperately needed cash flow to Timor from Bayu Undan. At the time, Greens Senator Bob Brown accused the Howard Government of 'blackmail', and was suspended from the Senate for the day as a result. Timor-Leste is now claiming, through its case at the Permanent Court of Arbitration, that Australia was well aware of its desperate position through the bugging of government offices in Dili, and that these agreements were made in bad faith on Australia's part. Timor-Leste resisted ratifying the Sunrise Agreement for years after signing it, and in 2006 the Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea (CMATS) Treaty was devised as a compromise, giving each country a 50% share of Greater Sunrise. The treaty also came with the condition that Timor-Leste would not raise the issue for another fifty years, thus effectively closing the possibility for Timor-Leste to set permanent maritime boundaries, at least until after Timor Sea oil and gas reserves had been exhausted.

As far back as 1974, it was acknowledged in Australian government circles that it was important to balance Australia's resource aspirations with establishing a cooperative relationship with an independent Timor-Leste: 'If Australia thus became a focus of antagonism, we would almost certainly lose much of our capability to influence or assist a newly independent government' (38 Cablegram to New York, 1974). Australia is acknowledged as a key actor in Timor-Leste's independence narrative; our assistance through the INTERFET peace keeping force during the 1999 independence referendum and subsequent violence is well remembered and appreciated, and AusAID (now DFAT) contributes roughly $116 million per year in aid expenditure, making Australia Timor's largest bilateral donor. However, it has also been well noted that Australia's profits from Timor Sea reserves, both during Indonesian occupation and post- independence, far outweigh the costs of any military and humanitarian assistance to Timor-Leste. As Dias exclaimed during our conversation: 'You can't give me a hand and take my arm!' That the alleged spying occurred under the cover of an AusAID program is uncomfortably symbolic of Australia's long- standing position towards Timor-Leste. Timorese sovereignty and Australia'ss economic self-interest in the Timor Sea have never sat easily together.

In January 2014, Downer wrote an opinion piece promoting Australia as a responsible international citizen after a series of attacks by the ABC and others, describing such criticism as a 'standard practice at the ABC. Whenever a foreigner criticises us, it's always our fault.' Downer describes CMATS as an act of charitable goodwill by the Australia government: 'In 2006 we struck a deal with the Timorese: we'd give them 50 percent of the revenue (of Greater Sunrise) because they were poor and we were rich. We didn't really need the money to the extent that they did.'

Strikingly, not once in Downer's opinion piece does he mention the awkward reality of the median line principle and UNCLOS, which might suggest that Australia may have 'given away' that which was, in fact, not its to give.

The upcoming months may prove to be dramatic for the relationship between Australia and Timor-Leste. It could well be that Australia walks away from the Permanent Court of Arbitration not just with the loss of Greater Sunrise, but with an unenviable reputation as a country that conducts international

agreements in bad faith, and exploits small, poor countries for its own economic gain. The game may well have changed. If Timor-Leste is successful in the Court, it will certainly seek to establish its own permanent maritime boundaries, in accordance with the median line principle. For Timor-Leste, this would be the conclusion of a struggle for self-determination spanning forty years. For Australia, it may well prove to be a clear sign that its economic self-interest in the Timor Sea is simply at odds with both the sovereignty of its tiny neighbor, and principles of international law. Perhaps having it both ways was never really possible.

Sarita Ryan is a teacher and researcher of labour, education and informal economies.

The Articulation of Tradition in Timor-Leste

by James J. Fox

Introduction

When The Flow of Life was published in 1980, it was intended to identify some of the distinctive features of eastern Indonesia and to shift perspectives on how the region was viewed. In that volume, Timor figured prominently. Six out of 14 comparative essays—seven, if one counts Rote within this area—were focused on Timor. Previous comparative efforts had been limited and were largely confined to the influential study by the Dutch anthropologist F. A. E. van Wouden. His work, Sociale Structuurtypen in de Groote Oost, in 1935—translated as Types of Social Structure in Eastern Indonesiain 1968—was based largely on fragmentary materials reported by travellers, missionaries and government officers. While certainly perceptive in many of its particular analyses, the work advanced a single formal model that purported to provide the original underlying basis for societies in eastern Indonesia.

The Flow of Life challenged this model by presenting a diversity of social forms in eastern Indonesia and by convincingly representing the diverse conceptual bases of societies of the region. The Flow of Life was the first study of its kind to be based on substantial fieldwork. As the book claimed, it shifted focus from the study of models to the study of metaphors—the often highly poetic articulation of metaphors of life.

This book, Life and Land in Timor-Leste, follows a trajectory set out in The Flow of Life. Like The Flow of Life, all the papers in this volume are based on considerable fieldwork. This work is, however, more specifically focused and critically formulated to consider local polities in Timor-Leste and the way in which they have survived and adapted to the Indonesian occupation, the United Nations’ presence and the present-day national development demands of an independent Timor-Leste.

Despite the great attention given to Timor-Leste over the past decade, few studies have sought to examine traditional social life as framed within particular traditional polities and in different rural areas. This book should therefore have a double impact—both theoretical and practical. It opens a new window on what is occurring in Timor-Leste. The initial question to ask of this volume is what comparative insights it provides and where do these insights lead.

Traditional Timorese Discourse

On Timor, traditions go deep. They are bound to the land—to specific places and to particular origins. Thus, the common comparative framework for all of the essays in this volume is their examination of Timorese traditional relations to the land and the significance of these relations. These relations—somewhat bewildering at times—are in fact the substance of life.

Struggling Geographies: Rethinking livelihood and locality in Timor-Leste

by Sandra Pannell

A Geography which Struggles I: Introduction

The island of Timor could be regarded—to borrow Edward Said’s expression—as a ‘geography which struggles’ (1993:6). Our understanding of this geography is dominated by a discourse of destruction and degradation. Writings about the island and its people commonly talk about the ‘Timor tragedy’ or the ‘Timor problem’. As James Dunn’s account reveals, the tragedy of Timor (see Dunn 1983:xi) is a story of gross injustice and local suffering, linked to the dismal failure of the international community to respond to Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor in 1974. Since independence in 2002, it seems that ‘poverty and unemployment’ are contributing to a ‘new tragedy’ in one of the world’s latest nation-states (BBC n.d.).

Timor’s ‘problem’, on the other hand, is said to be an island-wide ecological crisis, caused by swidden agricultural systems and population pressure.1 While the notion that local shifting cultivation systems in the ‘Outer Islands’ were inherently fragile and maladaptive to increasing population was first identified by F. J. Ormeling in 1956, it was Clifford Geertz’s study of ecological change in Indonesia that popularised the idea (Geertz 1963). While not intended as such, Geertz’s conclusions about swidden agriculture appeared to reinforce existing and overly negative European perceptions of these systems as primarily ‘attended by serious deforestation and soil erosion’ (Geertz 1963:15–16).

The characterisation of local subsistence systems as ‘voracious slash-and-burn agricultural regime[s]’, with ‘low agrarian production’ (McWilliam 2002:1), responsible for Timor’s environmental ‘problem’, has prompted a significant national and international development effort aimed at changing local land-use practices and improving the country’s economic circumstances. Yet, as delegates attending Timor-Leste’s first conference on ‘Sustainable Development and the Environment’, held in Dili in 2001, identified, ‘400 years of colonization by Portugal, and 25 years of occupation by Indonesia’ (Anderson and Deutsch 2001:11; see also McWilliam 2003:308) have also contributed to the process of ecological degradation and resulted in substantial changes to local subsistence practices. For example, Fox (2000:24) reports that during the latter part of the Portuguese colonial period, the Government initiated a series of agricultural extension programs in an attempt to ‘induce a shift of population’ to the least-populated southern coast of Timor. While the ecological and population density variability found across Timor-Leste was perhaps not an intended consequence of such social displacements, colonial resettlement schemes have, in part, contributed to the situation wherein the Lautem district in the far east of the country has one of the lowest population densities and some of the more extensive forested and coastal resources of all the regions in Timor-Leste. In the period of Indonesian occupation, as Soares (2001:20) points out, napalm bombing and forced resettlement practices by the military ‘saw a mass destruction of the environment’ and resulted in widespread famine. Dunn (1983:338) also comments upon the ‘rapacious exploitation’ of sandalwood and other forest-based resources, which the Timorese traditionally depended on for their livelihood, during this period. Speaking of livelihoods, both Soares and Fox report that traditional identities, constructed around particular modes of livelihood, have been severely eroded over the past 25 years as a result of population movements and a greater emphasis upon rice and commercial crops, such as coffee (Fox 2000:25; Soares 2001:19–20). Indeed, Shepard Forman (1981:87) goes so far as to conclude that for the Makassae of Timor-Leste, with the loss of their means of livelihood during the period of occupation, ‘the cycle of production and exchange which reproduces life has been broken’.

Finding Bunaq: The homeland and expansion of the Bunaq in central Timor

by Antoinette Schapper

Introduction

The Bunaq people occupy a large area of central Timor, straddling both sides of the modern border. Whilst the Bunaq of Lamaknen in West Timor have been the focus of detailed ethnographic research by Louis Berthe and Claudine Friedberg, there is no broader work on the Bunaq in other parts of East and West Timor. This chapter aims to contribute to a better understanding of the region of central Timor by exploring the history of the Bunaq-speaking area as a whole.

The Bunaq are linguistically and socially isolated in central Timor. Bunaq is a Papuan or non-Austronesian language, spoken by approximately 80 000 people. They are surrounded on all sides by Austronesian languages: Kemak to the north, Mambai to the east and Tetun to the south and west. The other Papuan languages of Timor—Fataluku, Makasai and Makalero—are located in a contiguous coastal area on the island’s eastern tip.1 The Bunaq language is widely recognised by the Bunaq and their Austronesian neighbours as ‘different’, and, while Bunaq is rarely learnt by non-Bunaq, almost all Bunaq are fluent in at least one Austronesian language.

In addition, the Bunaq are typically regarded by their neighbours with disdain, frequently being characterised as a coarse and aggressive people. This view has ensured that the Bunaq have remained somewhat apart from them. What is more, this external perception of their nature has fed into the Bunaq’s own traditions, such as the concluding moral of the folk story of two brothers, Asa Paran and Mau Paran: En Emaq g-epal legul. En Bunaq g-epal gol (‘The Kemak people have long ears. The Bunaq people have small ears.’) The metaphor of short versus long ears refers to the contrasting temperaments of the Bunaq (short-tempered and impatient) and the Kemak (quiet and uncomplaining).

These factors of linguistic non-conformity and social isolation have set them apart to some degree. But they have also led to an inclusive cultural attitude on the part of the Bunaq, involving widespread borrowing and adaptation from Austronesian language and society, such that Berthe (1963) was compelled to describe the Bunaq as having a mixed Austronesian–Papuan descent.

This chapter documents the processes of Bunaq expansion, using evidence from oral histories, placenames and data from the dialects of the Bunaq language. A subsidiary aim of this chapter is to illustrate how linguistic materials can be used to supplement and improve the picture of the past presented in oral histories. The data discussed here were collected during field trips in 2006, 2007 and 2009 surveying the Bunaq area.

After a brief outline of the basic principles of dialectology and how they apply to Bunaq in section two, I explore the history of the individual Bunaq areas in section three, showing where and how the Bunaq have expanded into new areas, mingled and partly taken over from groups of Austronesian speakers. Finally, in section four, I discuss the position of the Bunaq in central Timor in light of the traditional Papuan–Austronesian dichotomy. I suggest that, whilst the Bunaq have taken over Austronesian lands, they did not arrive after the Austronesians, but have incorporated many Austronesian features through sustained contact—a form of cultural ‘metatypy’ (Ross 2006).

Bunaq Geography and Dialectology

Today the Bunaq-speaking area (Map 8.1) extends in the north from Maliana down to portions of the southern coast of Timor-Leste; it stretches east from the eastern edges of southern Belu regency in West Timor into the western edge of Manufahi subdistrict in Timor-Leste.

Across the wide geographical area in which Bunaq is spoken, there are several different dialects. Dialects are geographical variants of a single language and dialectology is the study of this variation. Dialects are distinguished from one another by the distinct phonological (sounds) and lexical (words) features they display. Features varying between dialects are treated as instances of diachronic divergence from a common ancestor. That is, dialect differences arise when a population of speakers of a single variation-free language in one area replaces an original feature, X, with innovative feature Y, while speakers in another area innovate feature Z for feature X, while those in still another area retain feature X as X, and so on.

Map 8.1 The extent of the Bunaq language area

Darlau: Origins and their significance for Atsabe Kemak identity

by Andrea K. Molnar

Introduction

Membership in the former Atsabe domain is not separate from Atsabe Kemak identity. But in order to understand this identity relation, it is important to appreciate the Atsabe Kemak’s relation to land and particularly to places of origin. Darlau Mountain is one such focus, one origin place, and the question of who is a ‘true’ Kemak with a legitimate Kemak identity is enmeshed with this particular place of origin. In this chapter, I discuss the centrality of the great mountain of Darlau in Atsabe Kemak discourse on Kemak origins and identity.

Within the former Atsabe domain, Darlau is the tallest mountain (about 2400 m). Atsabe Kemak represent Darlau as the cosmic origin place where sky and earth were connected in the beginning of time when differentiation had not yet taken place. Darlau Mountain, as a place of origin, is often paired with or discussed in opposition to Atsabe Lau or Ramelau Mountain. Kemak people associate Ramelau with the dead, with funerary rites and the invisible villages of the ancestors, while they associate Darlau with living human descendants.1

According to myth, Darlau is the mountain where the origin village, Lemia, was founded by the first Kemak ancestors. Even the later invader who subjugated local related chiefdoms and amalgamated them into the larger Atsabe domain is legitimised through a connection to Darlau and the origin village there. The dispersal of settlements and the former small chiefdoms that emerged from these settlements, and thus made up the Atsabe domain, are elaborated upon by the Atsabe Kemak in relation to Darlau.

Darlau is also claimed as the site of origin for all sacred trees that, ordinarily, were not allowed to be cut down. In the ceremonial context of building origin houses, however, these trees are specifically utilised: ua, ora, taha buci and gorutrees. In the myth of the origin of fire, the ancestor brings fire from the top of Darlau with a taha branch. Identification with Darlau is thus a significant aspect of Atsabe Kemak identity and a means by which they distinguish themselves in relation to other groups. Old origin villages that made up the Lemia chiefdom were located on Darlau and are still visited once a year by descendants to clean the graves of the ancestors and to place offerings. Through origin stories, I will highlight each of these significant elements of Darlau for the Atsabe Kemak, particularly in relation to notions of authority, precedence and subordination (cf. Fox 1995, 1999). The argument reinforces Reuter’s (2006a:13) point that ‘in a traditional cultural context, Austronesian-speaking societies have constructed their sense of identity and legitimised their territorial claims to land and other resources by reference to local and sometimes regional origin narratives’.

Various ANU-based anthropologists have developed the concept of precedence for the comparative study of Austronesian societies.2 This group of anthropologists has suggested that a fruitful comparative study of Austronesian societies needs to focus on indigenous conceptions of origins. Fox (1988:15, 1995:214–28) labelled the different configurations in which this preoccupation appears as ‘origin structures’. He proposed that the studies of ‘origin structures’ and of the systems of precedence they generate are useful forms of comparison across Austronesian societies.3 Two major issues in the study of precedence concern ‘what validates precedence and what it confirms’. The study of origins in these societies sheds light on what precedence confirms, since it is only in relation to the past that precedence is justified (Fox 1994:106). Furthermore, ‘it is necessary for participants in systems of precedence to be able to trace relations to prior events, structures and persons’ (Fox 1994:106). ‘Context is paramount in the application of precedence…It is multivalued…[and] precedence can be used to create hierarchies, to dispute them, or simply undermine their creation’ (Fox 1994:106). Relations of precedence among the smaller chiefdoms encompassed by the former Atsabe domain are expressed in origin myths in relation to specific places of origin and the dissemination of settlements from such places of earlier origin. One way the Kemak define their cultural identity is through their relation to the Darlau, particularly to the first origin village, Lemia, and the first chiefdom that coalesced there. Origin stories are significant among the Atsabe Kemak in narrating the past in relation to the local topography and landscape, and indeed in connection with the ordering of social relations within the former Atsabe domain in relation to specific places within their locality (cf. Fox 1997). The origin village and Darlau Mountain serve as significant metaphors for ‘Kemakness’. While origin houses serve as the pivotal nexus of all marriage alliances that weave together the larger social fabric of a former domain, hierarchical relations among the component chiefdoms (the current main villages) are expressed in relation to origins from Lemia and Darlau. A relation to this mountain and to other significant places in the landscape is central in the narratives and local discourse on identity and intra-group relations and thus social reproduction. Various previous studies (for example, Fox 1997; Reuter 2006b) have highlighted the ways Austronesian cultures relate to place and the landscape in encoding their memories of place as an ‘origin’ structure, a ‘metaphor for living’ (cf. Fox 1980a:333).

Before proceeding to a background discussion on the Kemak of Atsabe, I wish to clarify the ways I will use the terms domain, and chiefdom and domain. Chiefdom and domain refer to a hierarchical, centralised political organisation of varying size with a formal leader: a chief or ruler. Domain refers to the extent of the territory over which a ruler or chief had authority. The heads of these various domains had different titles. The ruler of the Atsabe domain held the title ofkoronel bote; other lesser domains were headed by figures that held the ranked titles of nai, dato and rati.

While kin relations were recognised among the various chiefdoms that derived from the original Lemia chiefdom on Darlau, they were completely autonomous in their authority over their chiefdoms’ territorial domains and internal affairs. Once these chiefdoms coalesced into the Atsabe domain, the degree of autonomy of each chiefdom was affected—the authority of that chief had to be legitimised and confirmed by the rulers and the chiefs had to fulfil various obligations towards the ruler and the domain. Furthermore, the individual chiefdoms ceased to be territorially expansionist. The Atsabe domain, however, engaged in the expansion of its territorial domain that brought under its authority other groups, some of which were not Kemak. I shall elaborate further on the hierarchical organisation of the Atsabe domain in a later part of this chapter.

The Kemak of Atsabe

Kemak

A language of East Timor

ISO 639-3

kem

Alternate Names

Ema

Population

62,000 in East Timor (2010 census). Population total all countries: 72,000.

Location

North central Timor island border between East Timor and West Timor, mostly east. Also in Indonesia.

Language Maps

Indonesia, Nusa Tenggara and Southwestern Maluku

East Timor

Language Status

6a (Vigorous).

Classification

Austronesian, Malayo-Polynesian, Central-Eastern Malayo-Polynesian, Timor-Babar, Nuclear Timor

Dialects

Kemak, Nogo (Nogo-Nogo). Most closely related to Mambae [mgm] and Tukudede [tkd].

Typology

SVO

Language Resources

OLAC resources in and about Kemak

Writing

Latin script.

Other Comments

Traditional religion, Christian.

Suku Bangsa Kemak (NTT)

Kemak adalah suku bangsa yang sebagian berdiam di daerah utara Pulau Timur, di dalam wilayah Provinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur, sebagian lagi di wilayah negara Timor Leste. Wilayah asal orang Kemak sekarang merupakan wilayah Kecamatan Tasifeto Barat dan Kecamatan Tasifeto Timur, yang termasuk wilayah Kabupaten Belu. Orang yang berdiam di kota Kupang menyebut orang Kemak dan dua suku bangsa di sekitarnya, yaitu orang Tetun dan orang Merae, dengan satu nama, yaitu orang Belu. Namun, ketiga kelompok ini sesungguhnya mempunyai bahasa sendiri.

Orang Kemak menggunakan bahasa Kemak, dengan ciri-ciri yang berbeda dengan dialek bahasa lain di sekitarnya. Pada tahun 1984, jumlah orang Kemak sekitar 35.000 jiwa, yang sebagian besar berdiam di Kecamatan Tasifeto Barat dan selebihnya di Kecamatan Tasifeto Timur dan Kecamatan Lamaknen. Ciri-ciri fisik orang Kemak terlihat dari bentuk kepala delichosephal, kulit cokelat kehitam-hitaman, rambut keriting, dan tubuh lebih tinggi dari rata-rata suku bangsa lain di Pulau Timor.

Mata pencaharian pokoknya bercocok tanam di ladang dan beternak. Tanaman utama di ladang adalah padi dan jagung, yang sekaligus menjadi makanan pokok. Mereka juga menanam keladi, ubi kayu, labu, sayur-sayuran. Hewan peliharaan yang terpenting adalah sapi, kerbau, kuda, dan kambing. Ternak perliharaan itu digunakan untuk konsumsi sendiri, kepentingan upacara, dan keperluan mempertahankan gengsi. Mata pencaharian tambahan adalah berburu, bertenun, dan membuat anyaman. Berburu dilakukan pada waktu senggang sesuah pasa panen.

Struktur pemerintahan menurut adat yang pernah berlaku pada masyarakat Kemak, seperti halnya pada suku bangsa lainnya di Pulau Timor, dikuasai oleh kelompok kerabat tertentu. Kelompok kerabat ini menganggap dirinya sebagai keturunan pembuka pertama daerah yang didudukinya. Mitologi mereka menggambarkan golongan itu sebagai keturunan dewa yang turun dari langit dan kemudian mendirikan kerajaan. Penguasa adat yang tertinggi adalah loro (raja). Stratifikasi sosial dalam masyarakat didasarkan pada dekat atau jauhnya hubungan darah dengan raja, yaitu keturunan raja, kaum bangsawan, golongan tua-tua adat, dan rakyat biasa.

Sumber:
Melalatoa, J. 1995. Ensiklopedi Sukubangsa di Indonesia. Jilid A--K. Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan.

DAFTAR DATA DAN INFORMASI TENTANG SUKU BANGSA BUNAQ

Pe. Beny Mali, SVD

Dalam bagian ini, penulis memaparkan tema-tema penting tentang kebudayaan Suku Bangsa Bunaq. Suku bangsa Bunaq mengungkapkan diri dalam budayanya. Kebudayaannya yang tersistematisasi kemudian membentuk pola lakunya. Sejauhmana kebudayaan mendukung kehidupan kemanusiaan manusia Bunaq, dapat mengetahuinya melalui kebudayaannya sebagaimana tercetus di dalam seluruh penguraian berikut.

1. Kebudayaan Suku Bunaq

Setiap manusia berbudaya. Manusia menciptakan budaya, dan kebudayaan hasil ciptaannya itu kemudian tersistematisasikan lantas sistem itu sebagai ketertaan yang menata keterarahan kehidupannya. Selanjutnya pada gilirannya manusia memperbaharui sistem kebudayaannya demi menghadirkan perikemanusiaan kepermukaan sistem kebudayaan dan kemanusiaan itu menjadi jantung sistem budaya yang mengatur tata kehidupan bersama. Ketika menusia menciptakan budaya, posisi manusia sebagai subyek atas budayanya. Sebaliknya ketika kebudayaannya membentuk Suku bangsa Bunaq, posisi kebudayaannya sebagai subyek. Hubungan dialektika antara kebudayaan dan manusia terarah pada kehidupan yang manusiawi. Dengan demikian budaya yang menjamin kehidupan yang manusiawi terpelihara dan dilestarikan, dan yang tidak baik dalam arti tidak manusiawi lagi ditransformasi untuk menjadikan budaya yang semakin insani. Artinya budaya menjamin bagi tindakan yang manusiawi, bukan mendungukan manusia dan tertindas oleh budayanya. 

Manusia Bunaq adalah bagian dari manusia di dunia yang berbudaya. Suku Bangsa Bunaq menciptakan dan tercipta oleh budayanya. Paparan berikut adalah penyelaman ke dalam budaya suku Bunaq dengan tujuan untuk lebih mengenalnya dan sejauh mana kepedulian budaya suku bunaq akan nilai-nilai kemanusiaan yang bersifat universal.

2. Arti kata “Bunaq” dan Asal-Usul Suku Bunaq

IKATAN KELUARGA BERDASARKAN KEADILAN ADAT SUKU BUNAK

Pe. Beny Mali, SVD

Ikatan suami dan isteri dalam suku Bunak melahirkan anak-anaknya. Anak ini berasal dari darah dan daging ayah dan ibu. Dalam paradigma adat suku Bunak, dalam hukum adat suku Bunak, anak-anak masuk dalam suku mama. Anak-anak tidak menjadi anggota suku Bapak atau ayah. Paradigma dan hukum adat ini lahir dari system kekerabatan matrilineal yang dianut oleh suku Bunak sampai hari ini.

Ikatan antara anak dengan keluarga besar ayah dapat berakhir dengan kepergian ayah menuju rumah sang pencipta. Ada ikatan pun tidak seakrab ketika ayah masih ada. Ikatan keakraban itu juga akan mulai semakin renggang di saat ibu telah tiada. Pernyataan-pernyataan keluarga ayah bahwa dengan kepergian ibu ke pangkuan sang pencipta, menipisnya tanggungjawab ayah terhadap anak-anak dan urusan peradatan di suku mama, memperlebar renggangnya antara keluarga anak-anak dengan keluarga besar ayah.

Ada sinyal yang kuat sekali bahwa selama anak-anak dari ayah mendatangkan income bagi keluarga besar ayah, maka keluarga besar ayah semakin merapat membangun keterikatan yang kokoh dengan anak-anak. Sebaliknya anak-anak dan pihak keluarga besar ibu mendatangkan beban tanggungjawab adat kepada keluarga besar ayah maka keluarga besar ayah semakin menghindar dan semakin menjauh dari anak-anak dan keluarga besar ibu.

Keluarga anak-anak semakin menampakkan sinar keberhasilan dalam kehidupan dan keluarga ayah semakin melemah, maka keluarga ayah semakin membangun strategi adat untuk semakin merapat kepada anak-anak dengan motivasi agar usia senja keluarga ayah diperhatikan dan adat-adat kematian dari pihak ayah akan dibebankan dan ditanggung anak-anak. Ikatan itu dibangun dan diciptakan lewat memberikan sepotong tanah, atau seekor sapi atau seekor babi, dan itu adalah ikatan adat sepanjang zaman.

Ikatan itu disebut “akel goon” dalam adat suku Bunak. Ikatan itu akan berkelanjutan sampai tujuh keturunan. Ikatan yang didasarkan perhitungan untung dan rugi dari pihak keluarga besar ayah ini merupakan satu titik adat suku Bunak yang kurang menarik perhatian dalam paradigma “pemberian tanpa pamrih” atau “pengorbanan” dari pihak keluarga ayah dan keluarga besar ayah.

Dalam pikiran pribadi, orang tua baik dari pihak ayah maupun dari pihak ibu sama-sama mempunyai pertanggungjawaban yang adil sejak dalam rahim sampai mati. Keberhasilan diraih bergandengan tangan, keberhasilan dinikmati bersama dan beban hidup termasuk beban adat ditanggung bersama secara bergandengan tangan dari keluarga besar ayah dan keluarga besar ibu, dalam paradigma keadilan. Sang pencipta menghendaki demikian. Namun suku Bunak selama ini menyerahkan perjuangan orang tua untuk membuat anak-anaknya berhasil, setelah berhasil, anak-anak itu yang telah berhasil menjadi milik keluarga besar.

Suku Bunak tidak mau berkorban meraih keberhasilan generasi muda Suku Bunak, hanya membuka lapangan hati suku Bunak untuk menikmati hasil perjuangan segelintir orang. Pandangan meraih cita-cita adalah tanggungjawab bersama dan hasilnya adalah milik bersama, harus ditanamkan dalam hati, pikiran setiap anggota Suku Bunak demi kebaikan dan kesejahteraan suku Bunak. Suku Bunak sadar akan hal ini maka suku Bunak Bisa Maju. ***

Keunikan Belis Gadis Suku Bunak

Pe. Beny Mali, SVD

Ada banyak teman yang berpacaran dengan gadis-gadis suku bangsa Bunaq. Teman-teman itu ada yang berasal dari suku Bunaq, ada juga yang berasal dari luar suku Bunaq. Beberapa teman itu terpaksa mengakhiri pacaran dengan gadis suku Bunaq karena belis gadis suku bangsa Bunaq mahal. Mereka takut tidak mampu membayar belis/mahar gadis suku Bunaq.

Laki-laki suku Bunaq yang pergi menuntut ilmu di luar suku Bunaq, di luar pulau Timor yang dikenal dengan nama besar sebagai pulau cendana itu, misalnya laki-laki suku Bunaq yang menuntut ilmu di Pulau Jawa, khususnya di Jakarta, di Surabaya, di Semarang dan di Jogja, atau misalnya laki-laki suku Bunaq yang meninggalkan pulau cendana ke Pulau Dewata-Bali atau pulau Jawa, enggan kembali ke ibu pertiwi Suku Bangsa Bunaq, untuk menikahi seorang gadis suku bangsa Bunaq karena belis gadis suku Bunaq lebih mahal, di bandingkan dengan gadis-gadis yang mereka jumpai di Pulau Jawa dan pulau dewata.

Pada suatu kali, seorang pemuda suku Bunaq di Jakarta, yang mengadu nasib di Ibu Kota Negara-Jakarta mengatakan demikian : " Saya telah memutuskan masuk ke dalam PSIJ. PSIJ singkatan dari Persatuan Semua Isteri Jawa. Istilah ini terkenal di telinga putera Pulau Cendana yang mempunyai isteri yang berasal dari Pulau Jawa. Maksudku, setelah sekian tahun lamanya bekerja di Jakarta, saya tidak ingin kembali ke kampung halaman, tetapi saya memutuskan menikahi seorang gadis yang berasal dari pulau Jawa. Kembali ke ibu pertiwi suku Bunaq, dan nikah dengan seorang gadis suku Bunaq, belisnya mahal, setelah menikah dengan gadis yang berasal dari suku Bunak, diikat oleh berbagai adat yang tidak efektif dan efisien dalam pelaksanaannya, bukan menjadi mimpi saya. Nikah dengan gadis Jawa khan, belis tidak mahal. Bahkan tidak ada belis seperti suku Bunag". Komentar itu terekam di telinga penulis, ketika penulis berada di Jakarta, pada tanggal 15 Januari 2006 di Soverdi St.Yosef Matraman, tepat perayaan St. Arnoldus Janssen, pendiri Serikat Sabda Allah. Komentar-komentar yang bernada sama, juga keluar dari para mahasiswa asal pulau Cendana di Jogjakarta, di Surabaya dan Malang kota bunga. Kesan penulis bahwa komentar-komentar itu terungkap secara spontan, tetapi bisa juga kata-kata itu sudah dipertimbangkan secara matang sebelumnya. Yang jelas bahwa ungkapan-ungakapan atau komentar- komentar demikian, sangat dipengaruhi oleh adat belis gadis suku Bunaq yang menurut para komentator itu belis suku Bunak itu sangat mahal, bila dilihat dari segi ekonomisnya saja.

Belis gadis perawan suku Bunaq mahal. Memang pada umumnya demikian. Harga atau belis atau mahar gadis suku Bunaq dewasa ini semuanya telah diuangkan atau dirupiahkan. Pada umumnya, belis gadis perawan suku Bunaq berkisar 8 sampai 15 Juta rupiah. Mahalnya belis gadis perawan berbangsa Suku Bunaq seperti itu, bukan suatu keputusan sepihak. Tetapi semahal apapun, belis gadis perawan suku Bunaq itu, diawali suatu dialog adat antara presiden suku atau ketua suku pihak bakal calon suami dengan pihak presiden suku atau ketua suku serta keluarga bakal calon isteri. Semacam ada tawar-menawar harga belis gadis perawan suku bunaq itu, sampai kedua belah pihak setuju pada penentuan final harga belis gadis perawan suku bangsa Bunaq yang akan hidup sebagai suami-isteri. Dialog itu akhirnya tidak mencapai kata seia-sekata, maka pihak laki-laki akan membatalkan rencananya untuk menikahi gadis yang bakal menjadi isterinya itu.

Kalau kata seia-sekata antara pihak laki-laki dengan pihak perempuan tentang besarnya jumlah belis gadis perawan suku Bunaq, maka bagaimana proses pembayaran belis gadis perawan suku Bunaq itu? Siapa-siapa yang membayar belis gadis perawan itu? Belis gadis perawan suku Bunaq, khususnya di Desa Aitoun-Kecamatan Rai Hat, akan dibayar oleh seluruh anggota sesuku pemuda yang akan menikahi gadis tersebut. Bahkan, belis itu dibayar juga oleh teman-teman pemuda yang akan menikah, karena soal relasi, sahabat dekat, teman sekerja, walaupun bukan sesuku dengan pemuda yang akan menikah gadis itu. Bahkan juga yang ikut membayar belis gadis yang akan dinikahi pemuda itu, termasuk suku-suku yang menjadi asal-usul suku pemuda yang menikahi gadis itu. Proses pembayaran belis gadis perawan suku Bunaq demikian. Misalnya kalau, total belis gadis perawan suku Bunaq yang telah disetujui setelah tawar menawar antara presiden suku atau ketua suku laki-laki dengan presiden suku atau ketua suku gadis perawan adalah 15 Juta Rupiah. Presiden suku atau ketua suku dari pihak Laki-laki akan membagikan beban pembayaran atau tanggungan bayar belis itu kepada seluruh anggota suku berdasarkan hubungan kedekatan. Pemuda yang akan menikah gadis itu, tanggung satu Juta rupiah. Setiap saudara-saudari kandung pemuda itu, tanggung lima ratus ribu rupiah. Mereka yang berstatus Om dalam suku pemuda itu, tanggung duaratus lima puluh ribu tiap pribadi yang bersatus Om. Dan seterusnya, presiden suku atau ketua suku laki-laki akan mengatur sedemikian rupa, agar setiap anggota sesuku pemuda itu, mengumpulkan uang sebesar seharga belis gadis perawan yang telah disepakati dan diterima. Presiden menghitung seluruh anggota sukunya agar pengumpulan uang oleh anggota suku itu mencapai harga belis gadis yang telah disepakati.

Melihat harga belis gadis perawan suku Bunaq yang demikian, proses pengumpulan uang yang demikian, maka sebetulnya, belis gadis perawan suku Bunaq tidak mahal. Karena proses pengumpulan itu, mencerminkan kekompakan anggota suku. Kerja sama anggota suku. Dalam sebuah perkawinan intern, perempuan suku Bunaq dengan laki-laki suku Bunaq sesungguhnya belis itu tidak mahal.

Kecuali, pemuda dari luar suku Bunaq yang hendak menikahi gadis perawan suku Bunaq, mengikuti adat belis suku Bunaq, maka keluarga pemuda yang berasal dari luar suku Bunak akan merasa sangat berat dalam membayar belis gadis yang bersuku bunak yang akan menjadi isteri pemuda dari luar suku Bunak tersebut. Prinsipnya pemuda dari luar suku Bunaq yang telah jatuh cinta pada gadis perawan suku bunaq, yang telah dikuasai oleh cinta dan sulit melepaskan gadis perawan suku Bunaq, pasti melewati proses dialog-tawar menawar belis antara keluarga pemuda dengan keluarga gadis. Dialog itu akan berakhir dengan kesepakatan bersama kedua belah pihak dalam menentukan besarnya belis gadis perawan yang akan dinikahi pemuda dari luar suku Bunaq. Proses pembayarannya pun bisa dibicarakan dan disepakati, misalnya pembayaran belis secara bertahap, atau bayar sekali di awal pernikahan mereka. Semuanya bukan suatu paksaan, tetapi suatu kesepakatan bersama.

Penulis melihat belis gadis perawan suku Bunaq bukan sebagai suatu beban. Penulis melihat itu sebagai satu tanggungjawab pemuda yang akan menikah. Pemuda yang akan menikah, telah dinilai mampu untuk menjadi bapa atau ayah sekaligus sebagai suami yang dapat bertanggungjawab terhadap keluarga, adat dalam suku buna, dan relasi sosial dalam masyarakat suku Bunaq. Selain itu proses pembayaran belis gadis perawan suku Bunaq yang melibatkan seluruh anggota sesuku pemuda yang akan menikah, menunjukkan satu ikatan tanggungjawab moral si pemuda yang akan menikah, bahwa pemuda itu harus mencintai dan setia pada isterinya dalam suka maupun duka. Pemuda yang akan menjadi suami itu harus mempertahankan kehidupan keluarganya itu dengan penuh tanggungjawab terhadap seluruh anggota sesuku. Pemuda itu dinasihati presiden suku atau ketua suku, bahwa dia harus menjalankan tugas dan tanggungjawabnya kepada isteri dan anak-anaknya, sampai mati. Dia tidak boleh cerai dan meninggalkan anak-anaknya. Anggota suku pemuda itu hanya sekali membayar belis gadis yang telah dinikahinya. Kalau pemuda itu cerai dan hendak menikahi gadis yang lain, itu urusan pribadi, dan bahkan perkawinan itu tidak direstui oleh presiden suku atau ketua suku dengan seluruh anggota sukunya.

Suami isteri harus setia satu sama lain sampai mati salah satunya. Mereka harus menjadi orang tua yang bertanggungjawab satu terhadap yang lain, dan terhadap anak-anak, serta setia pada tata aturan adat suku isteri maupun suku suami. Menjadi orang tua dalam suku Bunaq, secara adat, memiliki keterikatan oleh tanggungjawab dan kewajiban dalam kehidupan suku Bangsa Bunaq.****